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Just Because You’re Offended Doesn’t Mean You’re In The Right: 
A Perspective on Language, Comedy and Ethics 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 Comedy should be transgressive and it should make the audience think about the joking 
matter in a new, deeper way. Of course, comedy by its nature should also be focused on 
entertainment and some people are not entertained by deep thought, new considerations of an old 
idea, or any manner in which their preconceived notions are questioned, tampered with, or 
affronted; however, that is not going to stop a comedian from doing their job. Because of this, 
there will sometimes be a disconnect between what the comedian says and what the audience 
hears; this disconnect is what can elicit certain negative reactions from the audience that all 
revolve around the idea of offense and being offended. 
 Generally, our understanding of offense is that someone has said something that we do 
not like, that is an unacceptable idea to espouse, and that in some way harms us. This conception 
of offensiveness leads to the conclusion that to be offended is to experience a moral affront, but 
is this the case? More generally, the question must be asked: is offensiveness in comedy a moral 
question? If it is, there must certainly be limits on what comedians can and cannot joke about. If 
it is not, then there must be some kind of an agreement that maintains a special status for the 
comedian in the joking context. This paper will propose an answer to the given question that 
appeals to both sides of the argument, but that ultimately holds that unless a person’s autonomy 
has been debased or attacked then the feeling of offense is irrational and should be more fully 
understood before responding to the perceived offense. This position is a proposed midpoint 
between the comedians and some philosophers, the former being the voice of dissent and the 
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latter being the voice of assent toward the moral question of offense in comedy. In order to grasp 
my conception of the solution, we first look at the existent positions. 
 The comedians assert that, no, offensiveness in comedy is not a moral question. By virtue 
of their craft or by their own personal feelings about joking, the prevailing sentiment seems to be 
that the joke cannot go too far as long as it is a joke as opposed to a personal verbal attack. 
George Carlin and Louis C.K. both relish the aesthetics of words and they also mention in their 
stand up how words are the mechanisms that we use to present our perspectives and ideas to the 
world and that censoring words and phrases is analogous to censoring modes of communication 
as a whole. Doug Stanhope stresses that “offensiveness” is a mindset that weakens human beings 
and that we are conditioned to react negatively to certain words or phrases which he finds 
deplorable. In diverging from the other comedians, stand up philosopher Ted Cohen shows that 
offense is a wish to be free of discomfort but he cannot find any moral culpability in comedy 
because of its lack of genuine harm or degradation of the audience’s moral character based on 
hearing and laughing at the humor. However, Cohen also maintains that just because there is no 
overarching moral theory that pertains specifically to jokes that does not mean that one should 
discount their feeling of moral reprehension as “false.” To bolster their case, they need look no 
further than Ronald de Sousa or Merrie Bergman who both maintain that jokes represent and 
bolster underlying attitudes that are implicit in the humor and that these attitudes can make 
manifest a power struggle between dominant groups and the oppressed. In other words, comedy 
is morally culpable because it is prevalent and it necessitates recognition of power or of a 
mindset that allows for the joke to be funny. But, then, how do we understand offensiveness? 
When offensiveness is discussed, the concept seems to be that the speech act has been 
experienced and interpreted as offensive by a listener. There are many conceptions of what it 
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might mean for an utterance x to offend a person P such as “x is offensive if and only if P is 
offended by x” or “x is offensive if and only if there exists P who would be offended if P 
experienced x.” My conception of meaningful offense is understand as such: x is offensive if and 
only if P could be reasonably offended if P experienced x. Reasonability is the key with the 
question of whether or not an utterance is offensive as it is possible to say that one is offended by 
any speech act, however the offensive content is not the same across all of these speech acts. The 
reasonability factor is what allows for some measurement of the offensive content and it is 
grounded in the innate quality of autonomy. 
In order for offense to be meaningful, the offending utterance must be intended and 
recognized as oppressing one’s autonomy. To be offended is to experience a post-reactive 
cognition that plays off of various, possibly unconscious, receptacles of experience: one’s 
vulnerability or moral conditioning or even the social structure that the utterance might be 
questioning. The operative point, again, is that to offend a person is to oppress that person’s 
innate autonomy, to attempt to circumvent, undermine, or otherwise tamper with an intrinsic 
facet of one’s being. But, how do we understand if the speaker is truly attempting to oppress the 
listener’s autonomy and how does the listener respond reasonably? The answer to this question is 
rooted in the binary or intention and recognition proposed by H.P. Grice. 
H.P Grice stresses a conception of linguistic meaning as a relationship between intention 
and recognition is summed up by the following: “A uttered x with the intention of inducing a 
belief by means of recognition of this intention” (Grice, 95). Intention imbues the utterance from 
A with semantic content and makes it a legitimate utterance or at least an utterance that is 
attempting to serve some sort of purpose. The other part of this binary is the need for recognition 
of the original intention by the speaker’s audience. This is the essence of why language is used as 
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a vessel for description in the first place: words and constructions of language are meant to 
induce a belief in some audience, known or not. Meaningful discourse necessarily includes both 
intention and recognition as Grice has framed them because it is through these cognitive 
processes that linguistic understanding is possible. Moving forward with the Gricean 
understanding, I will begin with a treatment of the offendee and an exploration of the question 
“is being offended necessarily to be harmed?” 
 
II. How Dare You: The Offendee 
 A central contention to deal with in discussing the position of the offendee is whether or 
not being offended is the necessarily to be harmed, or whether or not words can actually hurt us. 
My position is that, no, words do not necessarily hurt us, that our language does not have that 
kind of force behind it inherently. There are cases in which offense is helpful to the offendee: 
when a professor sits you down to tell you that your writing style is immature and needs work, 
you might be offended, but that feeling of offense is irrational; the professor had a good intention 
of relaying a request for you to work on your writing. There are cases in which being offended 
can be good for society as a whole, such as when Richard Pryor would use his humor to make 
the white racial establishment wake up and see how they were mistreating the black community 
or how George Carlin pointed out the hypocrisy and intellectual harm in censoring language in 
popular media. Where their jokes seemingly offensive? Of course, but they were offensive to 
those who could not see the greater positive message. Finally, there are cases where offense is 
morally neutral, but these cases will be given a more full treatment in Section IV of this paper. 
However, these cases are not meant to say that offensive language can never legitimately 
harm us: there are certainly cases in which jokes debase the audience through various 
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mechanisms including strengthening oppressive social structures and deliberately attacking an 
individual or group. These cases warrant special attention as they are the source where 
meaningful, legitimate offense is found. The social structures include cultural biases, general 
discrimination, and irrational feelings of hatred for individuals or groups. These structures are 
strengthened or weakened by individual actions, including speech acts. Thereby, it can be argued 
that utterances can entrench these structures that expressly limit the autonomy of oppressed 
groups and individuals. Again, this is the cause of meaningful offense: when a comedian’s joke 
serves to debase the humanity of an individual or group, their feelings of offense are entirely 
legitimate and are responding to a morally culpable act. The question, then, is how do we 
determine if a joke is strengthening problematic social structures? 
In addition to the binary of intention and recognition, H.P. Grice also argued that a 
listener understands the speaker’s meaning by making inferences called implicatures from what 
the speaker says to what the speaker means. A joking example: What do Winnie the Pooh and 
Alexander the Great have in common? They have the same middle name. The idea in this joke is 
not that a fictional bear and a Roman conqueror both actually have the same middle name; 
rather, the audience is meant to notice something that maybe they have never noticed before in 
the two names and thereby juxtapose the two figures while simultaneously recognizing the given 
commonality between them. This implicature requires various background beliefs that are shared 
by the linguistic community in which this joke is being told, i.e., that these two figures are 
known and that they are two very different figures. It is possible that the more you use these 
background beliefs the more you will reflexively believe them; as such, if these beliefs are 
supportive of the dominant oppressive social structure then there is a morally culpable set of 
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beliefs being further propagated and entrenched: this is bad. But, who is recognizing this moral 
culpability in comedy? 
The offendee is tasked with recognizing the content of the offender’s utterance while 
simultaneously locating the intention behind the offender’s word or words. Again, I maintain that 
in order for a feeling of offense to be philosophically meaningful it must stem from an utterance 
that seeks to actually oppress the autonomy of the listener, that attempts to create an environment 
or feeling in which the personhood of the listener is compromised, circumvented, or otherwise 
called into question by the offender. Merrie Bergman addresses this conception and provides a 
useful starting point for understanding offensiveness from the perspective of the offendee. 
 Bergman’s essay is aimed specifically at “sexist humor and what’s wrong with it” which 
provides a specific subset of jokes and humor that is generally considered offensive and is 
mainstream enough to be easily recognized and encountered by the average person. Bergman 
presents a cognitivist position that holds that “sexist humor is humor in which sexist beliefs 
(attitudes/norms) are presupposed and are necessary to the fun.” (Bergman, 63).  The various 
problems of offensive humor such as sexist humor all share characteristics which are easily 
understandable: the humor creates and reinforces stereotypes and humor allows these stereotypes 
to be presented as fact rather than simple mechanisms that propel the joke forward. In these 
ways, humor may allow for the solidifying of norms into legitimate biases that people then 
propagate into society as a whole. In Bergman’s view and in the views of any person in an 
oppressed group, this kind of joking and subsequent reinforcing is understandably seen as 
morally corrupt. 
 Bergman also gives an overview of views of the comic and theories of humor that are 
important to her thesis, the most applicable theory being the Incongruity Theory which she 
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interprets as referring to humor that is funny “if [the humorous episode] is contradicted by our 
beliefs, attitudes, and/or norms” (66). She connects this conception to sexist humor (and 
offensive humor in general) in the following way: “Sexist humor is humor in which sexist 
beliefs, attitudes, and/or norms must be held in order to perceive an incongruity or are used to 
add to the fun effect of the incongruity” (70). Extrapolating this idea to attend to all offensive 
humor, the idea seems to be that to laugh at an utterance that is based in an offensive mindset the 
listener must necessarily recognize the possibility of the joke to be true, at least along the lines of 
conditioned thoughts and feelings pertaining to the subject. For example, a dumb blonde joke is 
only funny if the listener legitimately believes that there exist women (or men in some cases) 
who would commit the dumb acts that are highlighted in the presented jokes. In this way, the 
listener “generates the appearance of sense behind an incongruity” (71) and is able to laugh at the 
joke. 
 Further, Bergman describes the idea of the hidden sense/moral incongruity theory in 
which the incongruity masks an “apparent sense in or behind the incongruity, or some element 
that makes the incongruity plausible” and that “behind the incongruity…there is always a moral 
– a point to the joke” (67). Generally hidden senses and hidden morals are separated but they 
seem to be operating on hugely similar ground in regards to the topic of this paper. In Bergman’s 
view, the point of sexists jokes is to reveal that the person (woman) being spoken of is indeed 
stupid or inept and thus she should ridiculed, that she deserves the derision for her inability to 
function on the same level as a man. Again, the obvious moral concerns here come from the 
listener or audience allowing the norms associated with and necessary for the successful 
operation of the joke to become more than just abstract notions: it is when the understanding of 
the comic content of a joke moves beyond the abstract to the real that problems arise. However, I 
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would contend that this move need not be made if the proper treatment is taken in regards to the 
responses to these jokes. 
 In response to Bergman, I would adopt a different cognitivist position that plays on the 
transcendental ability of the mind, that one need not be subject to an experience in order to 
discuss it, that accrued experience touches on enough topics that are closely related that I can at 
least attempt to adopt a mindset that is not currently or never has been my own. Specifically, it 
seems necessary to work with the power of recognition and the social ability to interpret a 
speaker’s intention. Laughing at offensive humor does not necessitate sharing the beliefs 
espoused in the joke just as laughing at a person falling on a banana peel does not necessitate 
having ill will towards that person as you are reveling in their misfortune. I would create a firm 
distinction between perceiving and seeing an incongruity or a hidden moral in a joke, as 
Bergman does: “When from our point of view an episode is incongruous, we perceive the 
incongruity. When we discern a point of view from which an episode would be incongruous, we 
see the incongruity” (70). Extrapolating from this distinction, I will focus on seeing the 
incongruity rather than perceiving the incongruity because seeing an incongruity is analogous to 
recognizing why an utterance would be funny if and only if it is stated within the context of a 
joke. 
 I begin to diverge from Bergman and De Sousa here as they both maintain that 
hypothetically assuming a set of beliefs is an unsuitable manner through which we would attempt 
to find the laugh in offensive humor. And yet, one adopts hypothetical mindsets often: consider 
the emotional construct of empathy, or the argumentative strategy of playing the devil’s 
advocate, or conducting a simple historical analysis of a person and their actions by asking the 
question “what were they thinking?” A rational, autonomous human being can and must adopt 
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hypothetical mindsets in order to interact successfully with the world around oneself. I posit that 
this assumption of beliefs can be done as well in the realm of humor and that often it must be 
done as a functioning part of the recognition side of the intention/recognition binary. In this way, 
one is able to laugh at a potentially offensive joke by seeing how the humorous situation (the 
incongruity) could be funny in the context of the joke by assuming the beliefs required by the 
construct of the joke. 
Additionally, jokes are utterances that have a special status in society. By their nature, 
jokes requires the listener to have a certain amount of background knowledge in order to fully 
grasp the nuances of what is going on in the language. They also require a certain context that 
allows for the fullest grasping of the aforementioned nuances and a level of comfortability 
between the speaker and the listener. More so, in a joking context the listener must give the 
speaker license to discuss taboo topics that are otherwise considered directly offensive. We allow 
the speaker to offend our conventional sensibilities and I would argue that we even suspend our 
morals in order to recognize the comedic content with as little personal backlash as possible. 
This phenomenon is seen in the conflicting response of laughter while thinking “I shouldn’t be 
laughing at this.” But, as Ted Cohen points out, we “may make the reflexive mistake of denying 
that the joke is funny” if we are offended (Cohen, 83). The trouble then is that the listener is 
doubly condemning a joke as being both offensive and not funny without allowing for the 
possibility that the joke is in fact funny to some without being meaningfully offensive to them. 
Consider the following potentially offensive example: “Why do black people only have 
nightmares? Because the last one who had a dream got shot.” The listener is able to recognize the 
incongruity (black people only having nightmares) through the mechanism of recognition of 
historical context (Martin Luther King Jr.’s assassination and his “I Have A Dream” speech). 
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The listener must also hypothetically assume for the sake of the joke a reality in which black 
people really do only have nightmares and then follow the logic of the joke to its end. Is this joke 
potentially offensive? Of course, but it need not be if the limits of the humor are kept within the 
limits of the joke itself. In other words, if a listener hears this joke and then firmly believes that 
black people only have nightmares they are violating the joking context and intermingling the 
abstract reality of the joke with our common reality in which it is simply incorrect to continue 
assuming the logic of the joke. 
As one can see from the above discussion of the cognitivist position on offensive humor, 
there is another position that becomes evident and that I attempted to combat in the 
distinguishing of a positional, context-driven humor ethic, that other position being the 
consequentialist position. This perspective holds that the possible complications of offensive 
humor stem from the “harm they cause or are likely to cause,” (Bicknell, 460) harm in this case 
tending towards the legitimizing of offensive feelings and beliefs. The legitimizing of these 
views is based in the idea that there is a community created between the joketeller and the 
audience and that a mutual laugh bonds them together on the subject of derision that is being 
laughed at (Bicknell, 460). This community bonding seems to portray a type of power dynamic 
that plays off of the higher power of the joketeller and his ability to shed some light on a funny 
topic for the amusement of the audience, that the joketeller “lends one’s authority” to the joking 
topic (461). It is understandable that this sort of dynamic would be troublesome for the listener 
who finds the jokes offensive, but there seems to be an essential disconnect here on the basis of 
how jokes function based on comedic content and context. 
Comedians are engaged in a continuing dialogue with audiences that can essentially be 
summed up in the same way that Socrates questioned citizens on the street: why do you believe 
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what you believe and what do you see in the world around you that has made you believe these 
things? Especially since the advent of observational humor as best represented by Jerry Seinfeld 
in our modern context, comedy holds up the mirror to nature in a way that other art forms do not 
quite capture. Plato was concerned about the effects of comic theatre in his perfect state and he 
maintained that comedy would necessarily be regulated so as not to upset the populace against 
the government by making the state a subject of laughter and derision. Comedy by its nature is 
forced into digesting experiences, perspectives, and general life into language that reflects for the 
listener how silly the world can be, how silly we can be. But, of course, this kind of reflection is 
context-driven. 
One of the facets of offensiveness is the circumvention of context in regard to how the 
offendee understands the extent of a joke. Bergman mentions this in her essay: “If a feminist 
does feel offended, it is not the humor that is responsible for the offense. Rather, she is offended 
because she is psychologically unable to separate what goes on in the parlor room from what she 
experiences outside of the parlor room” (Bergman, 77). Bergman does not find this conclusion 
strong enough as she continues on to affirm that any offense is “a real offense committed by the 
person,” (77) that offensive humor penetrates just as deeply and as tangibly as language that is 
explicitly meant to harm that listener. But, again, Bergman’s comments on offense must be 
qualified as universal. To take a strong position, humor is not universal and it cannot be by the 
simple fact that what is funny to one person may not be funny to another person. Offense 
operates similarly: what is offensive to one person may not be offensive to another person, even 
if those two people are part of the same group that is being joked about. Bergman shows that 
“[feminists] are merely trying to confine the fun [of jokes about women] within respectable 
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limits” (77), but, of course, the question becomes what are the limits of offensive language or 
can there even be limits? 
I would like to think that legitimate comedians are people who are well-versed in the 
nature of offense and who understand that there are some facets of the human experience that are 
vessels for negative feelings, facets that add up and contribute to a person’s feeling of 
vulnerability. This seems to be one of the ways that offensive language touches the offendee, by 
making an explicit move towards an implicit feeling. One of the ways that this kind of move can 
be understood is through the mode of “bad words.” Bad words provide a useful means of 
discussing the intention/recognition binary, but the one that I will be focusing on stems from my 
first conclusion in the first chapter which is that no word is inherently immoral. My reasoning for 
this claim is found in my second conclusion, that words become understood as immoral through 
processes of conditioning. When a person uses a curse word, the idea is that they are peppering 
their conversation with a term that has a greater semantic weight than other more commonplace, 
more acceptable terms: saying “I don’t give a shit” often provides more of a punch than simply 
saying “I don’t care.” 
The interesting thing about the latter phrase is that few people could reasonably say that 
they are offended by the phrase based on a) their recognition of the phrase’s meaning and b) their 
recognition of the speaker’s intention. In other words, the listener would not be offended because 
the usage of the term is not one that is meant to cause a reaction of personal offense, unless of 
course the listener had said something which they expected to be cared about and the speaker had 
responded with that kind of dismissal. In essence, as with all words, curse words have different 
usages and some are simply not offensive; the difference is seen or interpreted by the listener 
along the lines of their understanding of these various definitions and usages of the word and it 
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would reasonably be considered much more odd if the listener was offended by a curse word 
because they only know one level of its meaning. 
What these two conclusions lead to is a third proposition, namely that using a word or 
phrase that offends the sensibilities of the listener is not inherently morally corrupt though it may 
certainly be counter to social convention. Language is context-driven and that context is 
simultaneously driven by intention and recognition. There is also the question of levels of 
intimacy, feelings of vulnerability, and the general differential of power between the speaker and 
the listener, but the offensive content of an utterance is not necessarily an affront to one’s moral 
sensibilities. The offendee may feel a string of the words, but that experience is not thereby 
meaningfully offensive unless, as I have stated before, it compromises the autonomy of the 
listener, unless the individual’s capacity for rational decision-making based off of one’s own free 
will is oppressed or attacked by the utterance in question. But, what kind of perspective on this 
sort of offense do we get from a comedian, specifically a comedian who is known for his 
immense popularity and immensely dark material? 
Louis C.K. begins his record “Chewed Up” with a track called “Offensive Words” that 
has already been touched on. The last three minutes of the track are devoted to “the ‘N’ word,” 
but he clarifies for us “not ‘nigger’, by the way, I mean ‘the N word’.” Louis explains that saying 
“the ‘N’ word” is just “white people getting away with saying ‘nigger’” because the phrase is 
meant to “put the word ‘nigger’ in the listener’s head” through the process of intention and 
recognition. A person who understand what the speaker is saying will know exactly what the 
speaker is attempting to convey, but what that does is make the person say the word in their 
head: you recognize what it means and you are able to interpret the intention, that the speaker did 
not want to say the offensive word so he or she used a synonymous phrase instead. Louis takes 
14 
issue with this, saying “why don’t you say it instead and take responsibility for the shitty words 
you want to say?” 
While being a humorous example, Louis shows all the same that the semantic content of 
an utterance is dependent as heavily on the listener as it is on the speaker. The speaker obviously 
has to pack intention and the hope for recognition into a speech act, but it is up to the listener to 
unpack these ideas and conceptions, hopefully in the “correct” way or at least in a way that 
provides the greatest potential for full understanding of the utterance’s content. In this almost 
Hegelian dialectic, the offender assumes the role of the master conveying semantic content to the 
listener, but the slavish potential offendee stays “potential” until the offensive content is fully 
realized. In this way, the speaker could intend so much more (or so much less) than the listener 
ends up finding within the language. 
Grice discusses this understanding of the importance of the listener as such: “for x to 
have meaning, the intended effect must be something which in some sense is within the control 
of the audience, or that in some sense of ’reason’ the recognition of the intention behind x is for 
the audience a reason and not merely a cause” (Grice, 96). The audience must have some 
semblance of control over how the speaker’s speech acts will be construed and this imbues the 
audience with a kind of power that affects the speaker in profound ways: consider how 
widespread misunderstandings occur and how the intended effect of an utterance can be twisted 
into something entirely different than what was intended, like a more fully realized Telephone 
Game. 
Grice continues on and makes another pertinent comment about the audience’s 
relationship with the utterances of the speaker: “One cannot in any straightforward sense 
‘decide’ to be offended; but one can refuse to be offended. It looks then as if the intended effect 
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must be something with the control of the audience, or at least the sort of thing which is within 
its control” (96-97). By this estimation, one can see how the offensive content of an utterance 
can certainly be intended by the speaker but for it to truly hit, it must be recognized and 
construed as offensive by the audience. To tell a racist joke to an audience of racists will not 
produce an offended response, but it might produce a laugh. Similarly, to tell a racist joke to an 
audience that has no conception of what a racist joke is will also not produce an offended 
response nor will it likely produce a laugh. The audience’s recognition of the content of the 
utterance is paramount in the context of joking and of potentially offensive material. 
In many ways, it seems, the audience is more important to the creation of the offensive 
material than the speaker. By recognizing the offensive content, whether it is actually in the 
utterance or not, the audience or listener a) finds the offense, b) interprets it as offensive, 
meaningful or not, and c) holds this belief to be true, that the utterance was in fact offensive. As 
Grice points out, it is also possible for the audience or listener to refuse to be offended by an 
utterance which levies a certain amount of power and possibility on the potential offendee(s) as 
the actual creators of the offense. 
From a different angle, offense cannot exist in a cultural vacuum. Bicknell asks the reader 
to participate in a thought experiment: 
 
Imagine a world without economic or social injustice or prejudice, a world where even the 
memory of such injustice or prejudice is so faint as to be nearly unrecoverable. I submit that in 
such a world, jokes at the expense of gays, blacks, and other currently marginalized groups, 
would be no more troubling than lawyer jokes are to us today. (464) 
 
Bicknell provides an excellent concluding point for this chapter on the offendee by asking the 
reader to consider how offensiveness is constructed in language, where it comes from, and what 
the activist offendee (Bergman) could do to stop the negativity surrounding offensive humor. In 
a world where every person is truly equal, the vulnerability and oppressed autonomy that creates 
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meaningful offense would be nonexistent. However, it is also important at this point to consider 
the words of Naomi Weisstein, whom Bergman cites in her article. Weisstein explains that “it is 
extraordinarily difficult to understand what it means to be out of power when you aren’t there” 
(75). Then, in order to understand what it might mean to be in that power, I turn to the offender. 
 
III. Bad Words, Bad People: The Offender 
 The comedian is attempting to get the audience to laugh through whatever means he or 
she can. Jokes can require an immense of set-up in order to deliver the finely-tuned punchline, 
they can be matter-of-fact observations that are meant to display a ridiculous, absurd, or at least 
interesting component of life that the audience might not have considered before. And, of course, 
there are ways by which the comedian might offend the audience in order to elicit a laugh. But, 
how does the comedian do this successfully? 
It is possible that the offender finds the offense itself a misunderstanding. On his track 
“Giant Black Cock,” the comedian Doug Stanhope asserts the following idea: “If you are 
offended by any word in any language, it’s probably because your parents were unfit to raise a 
child.” This idea comes in a stream-of-consciousness rant that culminates after Stanhope 
discusses how he shows a picture of his father’s corpse to those who show him baby pictures of 
their children and how he uses the term “faggot” liberally without attaching sexuality to it. A 
casual listener might be offended by this tirade, but Stanhope continues on and explains his 
above quote in relation to offensive language, specifically words that have an attached social 
stigma: 
 
All it is is a sound that you can make with your mouth. It’s not a weakness that you have 
naturally...you’re nothing but weak. And your parents look at that and they think “not weak 
enough. We can make this thing even weaker by training it to react poorly to different sounds that 
you can make with your mouth.” (Stanhope, 2008) 
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Stanhope’s point is drawn along the lines of the seemingly uncontrollable emotional response 
that certain words or linguistic sentiments bring up in listeners. He advocates almost an amnesia 
that would wipe out the cultural biases that certain words are imbued with. However, for the 
person who might not be familiar with Stanhope’s work, he is a widely-recognized inflammatory 
comedian who is precise and purposive in the ways that he deconstructs social standards about 
language. 
A separate understanding of this sort of counter-linguistic turn is professed by Louis C.K. 
on his track “Offensive Words” (Chewed Up, 2008). Louis begins his show by saying to a 
random audience member “hey, faggot, how ya doin’?” and then continues on to describe how 
he misses when the cultural context surrounding the word “faggot” was not that of a negative 
connotation in reference to homosexuals but instead towards any actions of a person, hopefully a 
friend, that one found annoying: “You called somebody a faggot when they were…being a 
faggot, ya know? I would never call a gay guy a faggot unless he was being a faggot. Not 
because he’s gay, ya understand?” This discussion is later continued when Louis mentions that, 
simply, “no words are bad.” In a profound sense, Louis C.K. is confronting those who would 
confront him for using language that is conventionally held as offensive and thereby bad and he 
is not dismissing them as much as he is universalizing a language ethic that is self-contained in 
the language itself. His discussion continues with an analysis that describes how some people 
often use certain words in ways that are meant to be hurtful or hateful and these speech acts 
foster a negative connotation. In this sense, words themselves, while maintaining their ability to 
be vessels for meaning, are understood as bereft of the possibility to be offensive in and of 
themselves. 
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However, Louis C.K.’s distinction about words not being bad does not stop any person, 
specifically stand-up comedians, from employing “bad words” with the explicit knowledge that 
their language is considered “unacceptable” or at the very least taboo by the general populace. 
Because of this understanding, the offender must necessarily accept the weight of their words 
and be willing to explain themselves in a situation in which they are called on their offenses. One 
of the seminal comedians whose work was analyzed and critiqued in such a manner was George 
Carlin. In the chapter “Wurds, Werds, Words” from his memoir, Carlin discusses his admiration 
for all words and, more specifically, his love of pointing out how “we use, misuse and abuse 
words.” Before digging into the ethics of language that Carlin discusses, it is important to 
understand that there is a deeply aesthetic angle to the ways in which this man understood 
language. Consider his ideas about the rhythm and flow of insults here: 
Some guy came home from the service and I asked him what it was like being in the army. His 
reply: “Fine if you don’t mind waking up at five in the morning with some burly, loudmouthed 
cocksucker yelling at you.” Burly, loudmouth cocksucker. Great rhythm to that. Loud burly 
cocksucker: not the same at all. I wrote that down. (Carlin, 157) 
 
The importance of aesthetics in language need not be lost in the discussion of a language ethic 
and Carlin is vocal about this point in a different sense: to properly insult a man, your words 
should sound good or right together. Another way of looking at it would be that if you’re going 
to use bad words then you should at least make them sound good. Through this understanding of 
language, the listener is subject to language that is purposive and acts as an even more 
encompassing vehicle for meaning and content based on the choices of language that are made. 
Here then Carlin’s language ethic is relevant. 
 One of Carlin’s best known bits is known as the “Seven Dirty Words” sketch, which 
started off more generally as “Seven Words You Can Never Say on Television” and later 
morphed into “an equally mind-rotting, spine-curving, peace-without-honor sequel called ‘Filthy 
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Words’” (169). Out of these various bits, the listener receives a thorough education in what 
language means to a person who so frequently uses it in order to elicit not just laughs but 
introspection and critical thought. For example, in discussing the use of the word “shit,” Carlin 
points out that “Shit is an interesting word because for the middle class it’s still a rude, dirty, 
gooshy kinda word. But the word shit is okay for the man at work – he can say it like crazy” and 
then he continues on to give a list of different ways that the “shit” is construed to minimize its 
offensive quality and augment its societal recognition and, in some sense, its social significance. 
However, not every listener is willing to subject themselves to language that they find offensive 
and, as Carlin details, he has been brought before his fair share of courts with startling results in 
many cases. 
One case that is especially interesting is that of a man from New York who heard a radio 
broadcast of “Filthy Words” while driving with his young son. He subsequently wrote a letter to 
the FCC “complaining about the usage of such language on the air” and the ensuing dialogue 
between the offending radio station and the FCC led to release a statement regarding “indecent” 
language that defined such language as “words that describe ‘in terms patently offensive as 
measured by contemporary community standards sexual or excretory activities and organs at 
times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience’” (171). 
This court case was settled in the U.S. Court of Appeals but the FCC appealed to the Supreme 
Court which sheds more light on the conversation about the nature of offensive language in 
American culture by invoking the ruling of our highest judicial body. The ensuing case is 
certainly worth considering in light of my treatment of the offender. 
 For purposes of moving beyond the purely descriptive into the philosophical, a quick 
synopsis of the case is that the FCC won and it became known that the original complaint was 
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filed a man named John Douglas who worked for a conservative watchdog group called Morality 
in Media: he was essentially a “professional offender” in many ways (172). The majority 
decision from the Supreme Court included the following:  
Patently offensive, indecent material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen…in the 
privacy of the home, where the individual’s right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First 
Amendment rights of an intruder…To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the 
radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away 
after the first blow. (171) 
 
While the majority decision makes a case for reasonable offense on the part of the listener, it 
seems to entirely miss any treatment of the offender. For this sort of discourse, one must look to 
the written dissent: 
In our land of cultural pluralism there are many who think, act, and talk differently from the 
members of the court and who do not share their fragile sensibilities. It is only an acute 
ethnocentric myopia that enables the Court to approve censorship of the communication solely 
because of the words they contain…The Court’s decision…is another of the dominant culture’s 
efforts to force those groups who do not its mores to conform to its own way of thinking, acting, 
and speaking. (172) 
 
Through the message of the dissent, Carlin builds his own version of a language ethic that allows 
for any and all words and every sentiment that could possibly be expressed by a person. In his 
view, “words were the issue” (172) and to limit words is to limit language and to limit language 
is limiting entire systems of communication. By mitigating the possibility of offense, one is 
mitigating a greater possibility of authentic communication and this, in my view, is entirely 
morally corrupt, much more than an offender offending an offendee in any case. 
 To assume the role of the offender requires a cognitive effort that intends to use language 
in ways that will be recognized as offensive. As such, meaningful, autonomy-compromising 
offense cannot be understood as accidental: it requires the intention to oppress. Jokes can be used 
as weapons by attacking the individuals or groups in order to entrench negative ideas or to cast 
dispersions or inflate discriminatory conceptions. However, simply making use of or mentioning 
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oppressive structures and background beliefs in a joke does not itself oppress, again necessitating 
the intention to oppress in order. Comedians are able to and allowed to offend a sensibility in a 
person as long as they do not oppress that sensibility. The idea is that to poke fun at something is 
not necessarily an attempt to debase or oppress it. I maintain that most comedy makes use of 
oppressive structures without oppressing rather than actually making comedy into a weapon. 
Given these considerations, it is easy to draw distinctions in that there is comedy for good, for 
bad, and for neither. 
Comedy for good is often seen in the attempts of comedians to uncover and address 
social inequalities and societal flaws; comedy for bad is seen in jokes that use stereotypes and 
inequalities in order to validate the dominance of those in power and to further show that those in 
power are better or more correct; and there is comedy that is not meant to be morally culpable. In 
this final kind of comedy, the idea is that the joke is intended to be nothing more than funny and 
the audience is to recognize it as functioning solely for the sake of comedy. Any offense that 
might be levied in the language is not that which is intended to oppress or otherwise harm the 
autonomy of the listener, it is meant to aid the audience in recognizing the full effect of the joke. 
In this way, the offense is victimless. 
 
IV. Victimless Offense or Words Can Never Hurt Me 
 The question of whether or not being offended is necessarily to be harmed brought up a 
situation that requires further exploration. What happens in cases where being offended is 
morally neutral? Do they even exist? I maintain that these cases are legitimate responses to or 
conditions of certain types of humor and, more so, I will posit that to be the subject of a 
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victimless offense could easily solve the problem of meaningless offense in every sense. First, it 
is critical to understand what is entailed in victimless offense. 
   The clearest description that one can give of victimless offense would be in comparison 
to the concept of victimless crime. In such cases, an action is deemed illegal but the effects of the 
action stop at the act itself; there is a noticeable lack of repercussions for any person outside the 
offender and the act does not impede on the rights of others. Consider jaywalking in the middle 
of the night when there is no traffic on the road. Is this a violation of the law? Certainly, but what 
police officer would cite a person for this act? My guess is one who does not have the prudence 
to see that any potential negative effects of the jaywalker’s act are extraordinarily unlikely. The 
idea here is that a victimless crime only violates the integrity of a statute in any meaningful way. 
To be inflexible about the relativism of small-scale illegal acts would generally deem the person 
in question too strict or possibly too categorical about their views on crime. In this way, one can 
see how victimless offense becomes a more reasonable response to those who see no humor in 
potentially offensive jokes. 
 Can a joke violate a social standard or rule of etiquette commonly held by the general 
populace? Of course and many do, but I would still maintain that there is no real, concrete harm 
done in many of these situations. Another important distinction to make initially is that 
victimless crime is often seen as a consensual act. The criminal may agree to pay a prostitute for 
sex, but the prostitute also has to be willing to accept this money, thereby breaking the law. 
Victimless crime is inherently a two-way street just as victimless offense must also be 
consensual or else the speaker and the listener are both in trouble. If a person goes into a comedy 
club with the entirety of their social conscious intact and unprotected, they will certainly not 
laugh and they might even feel a legitimate sensation of offense. The nature of comedy is one 
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which plays on this implicit suspension of morals: we as listeners are able to laugh fully and 
unashamedly at jokes that might deal with injuring or killing lawyers or dumb blondes or any 
other joke that requires us to at least recognize the information that the comedian is attempting to 
get across because we suspend the parts of our ethics that would maintain that these speech acts 
are inappropriate in a non-joking context. Whether a person actually believes the information 
that is necessary to comprehend what makes the offensive joke funny, that person is able to 
temporarily suspend his or her post-cognitive response to address and fight against the offenses 
from the speaker. At the very least, you should know what you’re getting into by wandering into 
a comedy club; therefore there is some manner of preparation before actually being in the club 
listening, even if that preparation is simply to be aware that a comedy show is a context in which 
many taboo subjects will be examined and possibly embraced. 
 To address it once more, the sole factor that makes a feeling of offense meaningful is 
whether or not the feeling is tied to a debasing or oppressing of the listener’s autonomy. In the 
power struggle between speaker and listener, the listener ultimately has the decision about what 
to take away from the speaker’s dialogue. However, as was addressed previously in this paper, 
the speaker packs her speech with intentions that will hopefully be understood and applied to the 
utterance that the listener hears. In a comedy setting, the speaker may need the audience to 
understand that offensive content of his or her utterance in order for the joke to be found funny. 
I’ve discussed necessary background knowledge in the previous section, the idea being that there 
might need to be an ability to adopt hypothetical mindsets or to recognize stereotypes or 
archetypes that the speaker is employing or understand historical context in order to recognize 
the comedic content of an utterance. But, of course, comedic content is not necessarily offensive 
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content and offensive content is not necessarily comedic content. How do we then make the 
distinction in order to further develop this account of victimless offense? 
 The mechanism of offense is a fragile emotional and cognitive switch that some 
comedians have mastered in order to advance their craft. Through his offensive and self-
deprecating humor, Louis C.K. makes himself seemingly more human to his audience. The 
importance of this cannot be discounted when one is standing on a stage in front of hundreds of 
people and the power struggle between speaker and listener is in full-swing. He breaks himself 
down in front of the audience while simultaneously breaking down cultural norms and linguistic 
anomalies in order to generate laughter at the expense of and because of those things that we 
take for granted about ourselves and about our language. For example, Louis has a joke titled 
“The Way We Talk (Hilarious)” in which he describes the misuse of the word “hilarious” by 
some “fat white guys”: 
One of ‘em used a word that really pissed me off because it was how he used it. He used the word 
“hilarious.” That’s one of those words we use that we don’t care what it means…Do you know 
what “hilarious” means? “Hilarious” means so funny that you almost went insane when you heard 
that thing! 
 
Louis presents for his audience a distinction that will aid in advancing my concept of victimless 
offense, and that is the distinction between the following two understandings: That is offensive 
vs. I am offended. By developing this binary, it is much easier to contend with the mechanisms 
with which comedy offends and on what levels those offenses are occurring. 
 This paper has developed both sides of the given distinction as isolated sides of the same 
mechanism, but what happens when they are discussed in relation to one another? In looking at 
the phrase “I am offended,” the basic assumption is that there was an offensive utterance levied 
by some speaker to a listener who was reasonably offended by this utterance. Once an utterance 
has been deemed offensive, it is a necessity that one looks at the offending utterance and 
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determines where the potential offense has come from because there is a built-in possibility that 
the listener has simply misunderstood the intention on the speaker or that their own cognitive 
processes have developed an innocent phrase into something offensive. Consider a student of 
geography describing the location of Norfolk (pronounced Nor-fuck by Virginians) and having a 
listener hear them incorrectly and think that they were spouting off a curse word, thereby getting 
offended by the usage of said “dirty” word. In this case, we could see that there was an obvious 
misunderstanding and the subsequent explanation would dispel any lingering offended feelings 
or misjudgments of the speaker’s character by the listener.  
By no means are all potentially offensive utterances this innocent though. Consider 
another example that Ted Cohen uses in order to showcase a joke that “many people are bothered 
by”: How did a passerby stop a group of black men from committing a gang rape? He threw 
them a basketball (Cohen, 77). As Cohen points out and as I have discussed, the joke necessarily 
hinges on the listener’s knowledge of the existence of various stereotypes about black men in 
order to find any humor in this joke. There is no room for a misunderstanding, but there is room 
here for a moral objection, whether the objector can make a valid argument for their feeling or 
not. An argument that can and should be made though is a one that seeks to understand the other 
part of our distinction, the part that discusses and attempts to show why “that is offensive.” 
Determining why “that is offensive” does not require the full emotional and cognitive 
shift that accompanies the determination that “I am offended,” though it does require the listener 
to give reasons or some semblance of a justification about how or why the utterance has 
functioned in what may or may not have been the intended way. If the utterance as not intended 
to be understood as having any offensive content, there could be another misunderstanding or 
maybe an appeal to past experiences or some other personal reason that is not immediately 
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evident. Joking about the legitimacy of clowns as actors with someone whose parents make a 
living as professional clowns may very well bring about feelings of offense in the listener that 
were not intended by the speaker and the listener could assert that “that is offensive,” the idea 
being espoused by the speaker in accordance with the listener’s own feeling of being offended. 
But, the more striking example comes when the listener can say that an utterance is offensive but 
her or she is not offended. 
In advancing this idea of recognizing offense without being offended, a few necessary 
conditions must be in place, namely that a) the speaker must have intended to offend some 
personal or social standard that the listener can recognize; b) the listener must recognize the 
offensive content in the comedic content; and c) the listener must maintain an emotional state of 
“not offended.” The first two conditions are easy enough to contend with based on the Gricean 
model that I have been working with in this paper, but how does one contend with the final 
condition? I would first posit that the phenomenology of being offended includes both a mental 
and emotional shift, in that the offense and its extenuating conditions are recognized cognitively 
which begets an emotional response. Whether that reaction is positive or negative is up to the 
listener, though the speaker will almost always been seeking a positive reaction, in this case a 
laugh. Next, I maintain that a reasonable response to an utterance with some offensive content 
requires a measured intellectualization of what that offensive content is trying to do. If it is 
attempting to debase the autonomy of the subject of the joke then it is morally wrong. If the 
content is attempting to uncover or lambast some nasty personal or social standard, I would 
reasonably assert that it is morally good. However, if the offensive content is a necessary 
component of recognizing the humor of the joke, it follows then that it is an utterance that bears 
no moral weight. 
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Consider again the joke about the black men who halt their rape on account of the 
opportunity to play basketball. There is a potentially debasing sentiment about the nature of what 
a black man is, but that requires an intellectualization of the joke that goes beyond the basic 
sentiments that it is conveying. The joke turns on the idea that black men are caricatured as a) 
sexually aggressive and b) loving to play basketball. Of course, as Cohen points out, the joke 
does not explicitly say these things: it requires the listener to supply that background knowledge 
(Cohen, 78). The joke itself is humorous based on the understanding that these stereotypes exist 
and that these stereotypes have some kind of semantic content that allows for the listener to 
hypothetically adopt a mindset in which the considerations that are needed to be made to find 
that joke funny can be made – again, hypothetically and for a short amount of time – in order to 
recognize and appreciate the comedic content. In this way, a speaker can offend a sensibility of 
the listener without making the listener be in a fully offended mental state. But, again the 
question presents itself: can an offensive joke be morally neutral if it offends in any way? More 
so, can a joke harm the listener in any real sense through offense or otherwise? 
David Shoemaker’s thoughts as he puts them forward in “’Dirty Words’ and the Offense 
Principle” become especially relevant here. Shoemaker maintains in accordance with Joel 
Feinberg that there is a difference between harming and offending based on principles. For 
Feinberg, the phenomenology of harm includes “the violation of a person’s rights which involves 
a setback to that person’s interests” (Shoemaker, 547). To injure a person in a way that makes 
them unable to easily move presents an affront to their interest in being able to move freely. We 
often think of harm as being a physical attack of sorts that the harmed knows about directly, but 
one can also be harmed by covert means – stealing money from one’s bank account, for example 
(Shoemaker, 550). The difference with offense is that, as Shoemaker puts quite plainly, “you 
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simply cannot be offended without your being in an offended mental state, i.e., a mental state 
involving a negative attitude toward the offending action/event” (550). For further clarification, 
one turns to Feinberg’s definition of offense as “unpleasant or uncomfortable experiences – 
affronts to sense or sensibility, disgust, shock, shame, embarrassment, annoyance, boredom, 
anger, fear, or humiliation – from which one cannot escape without unreasonable inconvenience 
or even harm” (547). Given this definition, offense seems particularly insidious, but Feinberg 
maintains a distinction that is analogous with the aim of this chapter: to support the idea of 
victimless offense. 
As Feinberg’s definitions show, it is possible to say that to be offended is to be harmed. 
However, he draws a distinction that makes it clear that if being offended is any kind of 
legitimate harm then it is certainly requires more explanation because a mean word is not quite 
the same as a broken leg. Feinberg submits that “some offenses are (in a narrow sense) 
‘harmless’ in that they do not lead to any further harm, that is, they do not violate any interests 
other than the interest in not being offended” (548): note that in removing the victimhood from 
the potential offendee, one cannot move past the speech act itself. By this, I mean that the 
potential offense stops at the offendee and by necessity cannot move beyond what was said and 
what was interpreted. Based on the logical progression of the comedic, the next step is to laugh, 
to recognize the listener’s intent to be funny and thereby to have a post-cognitive reaction that is 
wholly positive with little to no thought tending towards any negative connotation. 
Grice also mentions offhandedly another distinction that helps to build the case for 
victimless offense, bringing up the point that “one cannot in any straightforward sense “decide” 
to be offended; but one can refuse to be offended” (Grice, 96). In this way, Grice portrays how 
“the intended effect [of an utterance] must be something with the control of the audience, or at 
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least the sort of thing which is within its control” (Grice, 97). He extrapolates this point by 
discussing the possible pun that is implicit in describing how one must have a reason for 
believing something which is “quite like ‘having a motive for’ accepting so-and-so” (96). 
Through this description, one can further grasp how it is that an audience could reasonably 
decide to not be offended by utterances that would normally sway them in a negative direction. 
This decision seems to call for two considerations, namely that a) the listener must be in a state 
of mind where they are willing to suspend their morals for the sake of the joke and b) the context 
of in which the speaker and listener are participating must be one that is comfortable for both of 
them so that (a) may be effectively accomplished. 
The way that such an environment is created so as to facilitate the given considerations is 
through the explicit understanding that the utterances from the speaker are all meant for the 
enjoyment and betterment of the listener. When these understandings are breached, that is when 
autonomy can be compromised and that is when offense becomes a real and legitimate threat to 
the listener. However, if one’s autonomy is not being threatened by the joke, then it stands to 
reason that there is something else beyond ethics happening here. When a joke offends a 
sensibility of the individual but the individual does not enter into the post-cognitive offended 
mental state, there is a legitimate victimless offense occurring. This phenomenon is not 
uncommon: listening to any ostensibly offensive stand-up comedian will result in the listener 
laughing in spite of one’s own beliefs. That, I posit, is the point of the transgressive, be it 
comedy, questioning thought, or otherwise. The purpose of these art forms is to place the subject 
in a situation in which one experiences some positive emotion or has some positive thought or 
reaction despite any information or instinct to the contrary that would have the subject reject the 
experience and label it (for our purposes) as “offensive” and therefore “unacceptable.” I maintain 
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that discounting the entertainment value of offensive value is a silly decision, but discounting the 
didactic value of being offended is morally corrupt in and of itself. Through victimless offense, 
the listener is able to full enjoy the comedic content of an utterance while simultaneously 
recognizing the offensive content and understanding it as a necessary component of the joke. In 
this way, the listener is able to freely laugh secure in the knowledge that he or she is 
experiencing harmless offense, harmless fun. 
 
V. The End of Offense (Yeah, Right) 
 Given the arguments in my paper, it is essential to clear up any misconceptions or 
lingering questions about the nature of offense in comedy, the first big idea being that despite 
any efforts on my part as a joke teller to minimize the number of times that someone could 
possibly assert that they are genuinely offended by a joke of mine, it is a facet of the questioning 
mind to combat the things that one sees as unjust or simply not okay in one’s experience. Cohen 
makes it quite clear in his final chapter that being offended need not be shooed away because it 
seems to be unrealistic or unreasonable: a feeling is a feeling and it should be expressed and 
respected. I agree with him up to a point, but my contention lies in the fourth section. I will 
always respect the offended listener’s mindset but I would seek to understand more about why 
they are experiencing that cognitive shift and thereby that emotional elicitation. If one’s 
autonomy has not been compromised then I would ask them to reconsider for themselves, not for 
me, why they are responding to my utterance with offense rather than laughter. What is it about 
my joke that got to you and what can we do to understand the feeling more deeply? 
 As Feinberg maintained, to be offended is to be in an offended state of mind. Grice 
mentioned that it seems unwise to say that someone can simply decide to be offended. Given 
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these two thoughts, the offender is dealing with an offended mindset that has come about 
naturally through the same ability for autonomous cognition that birthed the original offense. 
Given this relationship, it requires prudent action on both parts. Through mindful consideration 
of the offense, it becomes clearer that if there has been no debasing of the humanness of the 
listener through any intention or recognition on either end then the offense is by its nature 
victimless and to be victimless is to be unharmed. Then, in our unharmed state, we are able to 
laugh freely with full appreciation of the joke and all of its content. 
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